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Since its earlier study by Mueller, the literature on public support for 
war or military intervention has been one of the most critical subfields 
in international relations for over five d e cades.1 V a rious s c holars h a ve 
found a series of factors explaining the fluctuation of public support for 
war, including the human and financial cost o f  war2, objectives of war3, 
multilateral linkages and institutions4, ethnicity5, partisanship6, education7, 
gender8, and war experience9. The accumulation of these research findings 
provides a strong benchmark for policymakers to assess the costs and 
impact of their foreign intervention policies and behaviours from the 
domestic audience. 
Nevertheless, the extant literature suffers two major shortcomings. First, 
most cases of this study focus on the Western states, especially the public 
opinion in the United States and United Kingdom, with a few exceptions.10 
This generates a generalizability issue as to whether the extant literature 
findings could apply to explain the fl uctuations of  pu blic su pport fo r wa rs 
in non-Western contexts. Following the first notion, the second critical 
issue in the current studies of war support is that in most cases, since 
these are established powers, and their foreign military operations are 
all interventionist wars outside their homelands; to the public in these 
countries, whether to support these operations is considered as a choice 
instead of a “must.”
To elaborate, citizens in non-Western and non-major power states are 
more likely to be subject to the threat of war in which their livinghood may 
become the battlefield if the war occurs. For example, if China decides to 
7
invade Taiwan for the purpose of unification, then Taiwan will likely be 
the battlefield where Taiwanese citizens have to defend the island from a 
Chinese military operation. Another vivid example is Russia’s military 
intervention in Ukraine. What Ukrainians needed to consider was whether 
they would stand up and fight against Russian troops and how exactly they 
could defend against Russian troops in the Ukrainian homeland. Unlike the 
US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US citizens only needed 
to consider whether they should support the administration’s decisions in 
waging wars on foreign soil without worrying that the wars could spread 
back to the US homeland. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
mechanisms driving the public support for war outside the Western contexts 
are different. That is, how the public views wars of choice is not the same as 
wars of necessity.
Three reasons support this articulation. First, the research on war 
support indicates that when the public learns about casualties originated 
from local neighbourhoods, they would reduce their support for this 
ongoing military operation.11 Wars would certainly incur a higher number 
of casualties, and these casualties, undoubtedly, would come from the 
homeland. However, whether the public would simply reduce their support 
of self-defence willingness due to the increase in casualties is not clear, 
since losing the battle may mean the elimination of their beloved sovereign 
state and the political institutions and society they embrace. 
Second, we often see that countries facing wars of necessity rely on a 
conscription system instead of a voluntary military system. Research has 
shown that the employment of conscription systems has a substantial impact 
on public support for wars.12 The conscription enhances the capability of 
defending from an aggressor and helps the public be more aware of the cost 
and consequence of war. Some research has indicated that the public will 
be more supportive of conflict when they consider their training could help 
them better prepare to defend themselves.13
The reason is obvious. When a large segment of the population is 
required to serve in the military, the public is generally more aware of 
the costs and benefits of an armed conflict. Moreover, in the event where 
people’s living environment will be intruded by the war, the public will 
certainly take a different type of consideration when judging the utility of 
defending their livinghood, given the fact that more accurate information 
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and understanding of warfare is aware by the general public. Thus, with 
the conscription system installed, the general public would certainly take 
a different standpoint when considering their support of self-defence, 
especially in the case of wars of necessity. 
Third, considering those countries that face immediate threats from 
aggressors, such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, they often need to 
rely on other major powers to support their military operations against the 
aggressors. In this scenario, public support for wars of necessity would have 
to channel in the security commitment from the major powers and their 
likelihood of intervention if the war occurs. The literature on war support 
has found that the public tends to feel more secure and confident with their 
capability of defending from aggressors if an ally provides a strong security 
commitment.14 Nevertheless, some do disagree with this view and contend 
that the ally’s security provision may invoke backlash. Scholars have found 
that the public in Japan and South Korea perceive the United States troops 
who station in these two countries as a source of social chaos and unease.15 
By far, it is clear that the public may react in distinctive ways toward 
wars of necessity and wars of choice. In this chapter, I discuss how the 
existing mechanisms explaining public support for war could be altered 
under the condition of wars for necessity. Yeh and Wu provided an empirical 
examination of public support for wars of necessity with a case study on 
Taiwan.16 It would serve as the benchmark for our theoretical reasonings 
below. I focus my discussion on four main factors — costs of war, objectives 
of war, ethnicity, and multilateralism. 
As mentioned before, the literature of public support for wars of choice 
has generated a solid conclusion that war costs, such as casualties and 
financial expenses, would lead to a lower level of support for this military 
operation, as evidenced in the Vietnam War, US military intervention in 
Somalia, Iraq War in 2003, and many others. In general, public support for 
war declines along with the increase of war costs. 
However, in the context of public support for wars of necessity, it may 
not work in the same venue. In studies of public support for wars of choice, 
the costs are tangible and often can be observed in the real world (unless it 
is an experimental study with a hypothetical scenario). In studies of public 
support for wars of necessity, the costs are always hypothetical. That is, it 
is impossible to examine the public support for wars of necessity with a 
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war onset as the subjects’ livinghood is invaded by perpetrators at the same 
moment. All we can understand is the willingness to defend the subjects’ 
homeland before the war occurs.
Therefore, whether the public facing wars of necessity would be relatively 
more supportive of self-defence is likely to depend on how it views the 
importance of defending the country. This means, the willingness of self-
defence is highly contingent on the perceived objectives and values among 
the public when the war breaks out. If defending the state’s sovereignty, 
its political institution, and the society is considered the top priority of its 
citizens, then war costs may not be associated with the degree of willingness 
of self-defence. On the other hand, if the public deems the invasion from a 
foreign state as favourable, or at least is indifferent to the idea of replacing 
the current government with the one from the invader, then they may be 
unwilling to support the hypothetical war and are very sensitive to the war 
costs. 
To be specific, in the scenario whether the public is choosing to support 
an intervention war where their homeland is intact, which applies to every 
foreign intervention operation carried out by a major military power, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom, the public can comprehend 
the war objectively and rationally in a simple cost and benefit calculation. 
But when the war is determined to intrude on the citizens’ livinghood, it is 
a matter of life and death, and the public does not have a choice. Therefore, 
when the public faces the potential challenge of wars of necessity, they 
rely on another rationale to consider whether they are willing to protect 
their home country. This includes whether protecting their political 
institutions and society is critical in their value system, and also whether 
they perceive the enemy is generally an acceptable alternative ruler due to 
ethnical similarity, economic incentives, party identification if there are 
political parties promoting a narrative favouring surrender to the potential 
perpetrator, etc. 
In addition to a different calculation of war costs and other political and 
social factors when comparing public support for wars of necessity and wars 
of choice, the influence of multilateralism is critical in gauging the will 
to defend. This is particularly the case for those small powers under the 
threats of major powers. As the nature of this war is likely to be unbalanced, 
the public of those small states tends to evaluate the chances of a successful 
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defence or deterrence against the major power invader to be lower. Thus, 
whether another major state or a set of strong powers are willing to bear the 
costs of war collectively is important in citizens’ calculation of war success 
and leads to a higher level of showing their defence willingness.17 However, 
alternatively, citizens may free ride the major powers’ commitment, and 
they may instead become unwilling to defend their home country. Future 
studies may discover more evidence in this domain. 
Taiwan would serve as an excellent example to illustrate the mechanisms 
mentioned above. Its complicated historical past, including the Japanese 
colonization and the loss of war to the Communist Party of China and the 
Mainland China by the Nationalist party (Kuomintang) and its authoritarian 
rules before democratization in 1996, the public in Taiwan used to encounter 
some identity crises in their entangling cultural, social, and historical 
traits with China. On the other hand, China has also tried its best to co-
opt Taiwanese business and political elites and wished this could attract the 
public to be more leaning toward the idea of unification without warfare. 
However, as the majority of Taiwanese has claimed a Taiwanese identity18 in 
recent years and the favouritism toward unification declined significantly19, 
China has resorted to coercion with the People’s Liberation Army’s fighter 
jets crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait constantly since the 
campaigning period of the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election to even now 
in 2021.20 Aside from the bilateral interaction, the US-China relationship 
also plays a critical role as we are witnessing another great power 
competition after the Cold War, starting during the US-China trade war in 
2018.21 Compared to China’s military threats to Taiwan, the United States 
is making its stance over Taiwan’s security clearer without fundamentally 
altering its foreign policy doctrine, Strategic Ambiguity, toward the Strait.22 
This evidences that studies of public support for wars of necessity are ever 
more critical than now. 
As Yeh and Wu detail in their study of the war of necessity in Taiwan 
against a potential invasion from China: “Although there are several reasons 
to postulate that the public facing a war of necessity will react differently 
from those facing wars of choice in Western states, we found support for 
most of the indicators such as principle policy objectives, multilateralism, 
ethnicity, partisanship, generation, and education. This result increases our 
confidence of the generalizability of existing findings in the literature.”23 
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In addition, other research also has shown that the security commitment 
from the United States is vital to the self-defence willingness among the 
Taiwanese public.24 To enhance the generalizability of the research on the 
willingness of self-defence for wars of necessity, replications of the research 
by Yeh and Wu and its extension are urgent.
Taken together, individual preferences of wars of choice compared to 
wars of necessity is certainly different. This chapter provides an overview 
and illustrates some mechanisms that would extend our understanding of 
this comparison. Scholars and policymakers have to consider these visible 
and vital differences to better understand the public support for wars of 
necessity.
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